

Mitigation of Security Attack in Android Application Using Pin Tool

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ABSTRACT

The popularity and adoption of smartphones has greatly stimulated the spread of mobile malware, especially on the popular platforms such as Android. In light of their rapid growth, there is a pressing need to develop effective solutions. In the past few years, mobile devices (smartphones, PDAs) have seen both their computational power and their data connectivity rise to a level nearly equivalent to that available on small desktop computers, while becoming ubiquitous. On the downside, these mobile devices are now an extremely attractive target for large-scale security attacks. Mobile device middleware is thus experiencing an increased focus on attempts to mitigate potential security compromises. In particular, Android incorporates by design many well-known security features such as privilege separation. In this thesis the Android security model and some potential weaknesses of the model is described. Thesis provides taxonomy of attacks to the platform demonstrated by real attacks that in the end guarantee privileged access to the device and mitigation technique for the same attack would be proposed. The result analysis and testing would be done on mitigation technique.

Keywords: Dynamic Analysis, Runtime, Binary Instrumentation, Pin, Pin tool, Intel, Just-in-time compiler, security attack, android Attack.

I. INTRODUCTION

Instrumentation is a simple technique for inserting any extra line of code in to an application to observe its behavior. It can be performed at various stages – inside the source code, at compile time, post link time, or even at run time. Source Code Instrumentation is a way to instrument source programs and Binary Instrumentation is to instrument binary executable directly Static binary instrumentation (SBI) occurs before the program is run phase, a phase in which we can rewrite executable code or object code. Dynamic binary instrumentation (DBI) is done at run time.

Program Analysis

| | Static Category | Dynamic Category |
|-------------|------------------------|-------------------------|
| Source Type | Static source analysis | Dynamic source analysis |
| Binary Type | Static binary analysis | Dynamic binary analysis |

Table (1). Types of Program Analysis

Static Analysis and Dynamic Analysis:

Static analysis is the process of analysing the source code or machine code of the program without need of running it **Dynamic analysis** is the process of analysing program as it executes or at the runtime.

Source Analysis and Binary Analysis:

Source analysis is the process of analysing programs at the level of source code. Source analysis are generally done for the points of programming language constructs such as expressions, statements, functions, and variables.

Binary analysis is the process of analysing programs at the level of machine code, that stored either as object code (pre-linking) or executable code (post-linking). In this category, we have analysis that are performed at the level of executable intermediate representations, such as byte-codes, that runs on a particular virtual machine. Binary analysis are generally done for the points

machine entities, such as registers, memory locations, procedures, and instructions.

Pin

Pin has been the framework of choice for researchers working on program analysis and related tools. It can be used for several purposes, but mostly for program analysis (memory allocation analysis, error detection, performance profiling, etc...) and for architectural study (processor and cache simulation, trace collection, etc...). PIN is a dynamic binary instrumentation engine or framework. Pin is used for the instrumentation of software programs. It supports many platforms like Windows, Linux, Mac OS and Android executable for IA-32, and Intel(R) 64[4]. The Pin allows a programmer to insert any arbitrary code (written in C or C++) at arbitrary places in the executable (run time of any program). The code is added dynamically while the executable (program) is in the running phase. The input to this compiler is not byte code, but a regular executable. Pin dynamically re-compiles the application during execution. The Pin kit includes many tools (they can be found at: pin-w-x-y-android/source/tools). The tools are provided as source files .Pin provides the framework and API.

Pin Architecture




Figure 1. Pin architecture [1]

Pin consists of a virtual machine (VM), a code cache, and an instrumentation API invoked by Pin tools. The VM consists of a just-in-time compiler (JIT), an emulator, and a dispatcher. After Pin control of the application, the VM coordinates its components to execute the application. The JIT compiles and

instruments application code, which is then launched by the dispatcher. The compiled code is stored in the code cache. The emulator interprets instructions that cannot be executed directly. It is used for system calls which require special handling from the VM. (E.g. system calls)

II. METHODS AND MATERIAL

A. Pin Tool

Applying pin tool to application

After developing pin tool, next step is to apply it to an application as follows:

```
Pin [pin-option]... -t [tool name] [tool-options]... --
[application] [application- option]
```

The following options are the ones that are frequently used:

- -t tool name: defines the specific pin tool to use.
- -pause tool n: an option which prints out the process id and then pause Pin for n Seconds to allow it attaching with gdb.
- -pid pid: used to attach pin tool to an already running process (executable) with the Given process id.

Pin tool is the instrumentation program. Pin tools run on Pin to perform meaningful tasks. The inscount pin tool is used to find out the number of instructions in the running program.

Instrumentation consists of two components:

1. A mechanism that decides where and what code is inserted
2. The code to execute at insertion points

These two components are instrumentation and analysis code.

III. LITERATURE REVIEW

1. Pin: Building Customized Program Analysis Tools with Dynamic Instrumentation

In this Paper they have described that pin is robust and powerful software instrumentation tool for program analysis tasks such as

- 1) Profiling
- 2) Performance Evaluation
- 3) Bug Detection

2. Behavioral Analysis of Android Applications Using Automated Instrumentation

In this paper, they present efforts on effective security inspection mechanisms for identification of malicious applications for Android mobile applications.

- 1) Count the number of Instruction in the original Application.
- 2) Count the number of Instruction in the Malicious Application.
- 3) If Number of Instruction are different then know there are some extra line of code in the application code

3. All Your Droid Are Belong to Us: A Survey of Current Android Attacks

In this paper we look to Android as a specific instance of mobile computing. We first discuss the Android security model and some potential weaknesses of the model. We then provide taxonomy of attacks to the platform demonstrated by real attacks that in the end guarantee privileged access to the device. Where possible, we also propose mitigations for the identified vulnerabilities.

4. Analysis and Research of System Security Based on Android

In this paper, it has analysis Android system's security mechanisms with widely used in mobile platforms. It has separately introduced its system architecture, security mechanism and safety problems. Through it has analysis Android security mechanisms and its components; it has set to the Android security, safety mechanism side, system security and data security. It has promoted system security to system permission. At the same time it analysis the Android security risks, it has deeply researched the attack based on Linux kernel. It has proposed security mechanisms based on SELinux policy theory to ensure system security on application program framework layer.

5. Patch droid: scalable third party security patches for android devices.

In this paper they have presented patch droid, a System to patch security vulnerabilities on legacy android Android devices, Patch droid uses dynamic instrumentation techniques to patch vulnerabilities in memory, and uses a path distribution service so that patches only have to be created once and can be deployed on every devices. Because patches are injected directly into the processes, Patch droid does not need to flash or modify system partitions or binaries, making it universally deployable even on tightly controlled devices.

Proposed System

6. Mitigation of security attack in android application using pin tool

Step1:




Figure 2. Mitigation of security attack in android application using pin tool

Step 2:




Figure 3. Proposed steps

IV. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Getting the system ready

Table 2. System Specification

| | |
|------------------|--|
| Operating System | Ubuntu 14.04 32 Bit |
| Android | ADT Bundle with eclipse and sdk |
| API used for sdk | API 18,19 |
| Android Device | INTEL AVD (x86)with hardware emulation |
| | Busy box and Pin installed |
| NDK Version | Ndk 9(gcc 4.6) 32 Bit |
| PIN Version | Pin 2.14-67254 gcc4.6 |
| | |

Installation on Ubuntu




Figure 4. Install Ubuntu in my system

Install Android SDK and AVD, Eclipse

Start eclipse and AVD.

Malicious calculator android application in eclipse.

There are two values add, mul, sub, div.




Figure 5. Install Android SDK and AVD, Eclipse in

Implement pin framework on system

Start the terminal and use to command

Run on pin this command. /pin -version and. /pin -- /system/bin/ls.





Figure 6. The pin framework version on android avd

Before output of malicious calculator application



Figure 7. Output of malicious calculator application

Mitigate malicious calculator application using pin tool

We have compiled the mitigation pin tool in the android avd and then attached it to the running android application. The application we used is CalculatorApp.apk. As we can see the image that the directory of the bin in the android avd contains a file name “mitigation.out”. This file is made when we have compiled and attached the pin tool to the application process. When we open that file we can see mitigate attack during the running of the Malicious Calculator Application.

```
root@generic_86 : /data/busybox # ./pin -- /system/bin/ls
android-install.tar.gz
busybox
ia32
mitigation.out
intel64
obj-ia32
pin
pin.log
pintool.log
root@generic_86 : /data/busybox # cat mitigation.out
Mitigate attack successfully
root@generic_86 : /data/busybox #
```

Figure 8. Mitigate attack in malicious calculator application using pin tool

Final output of calculator application



Figure 9. Mitigate attack in malicious calculator application using pin tool

Count the number of instruction for calculator application using pin tool

Inscout pin tool

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include "pin.H"
using namespace std;
UINT64 icount = 0;
// Variable to keep running count of instructions
VOID docount()
{
    icount++;
}
// whenever any new instruction is executed.
VOID Instruction (INS ins, VOID *v)
{
    INS_InsertCall (ins, IPOINT_BEFORE, (AFUNPTR) docount, IARG_END);
    // this function insert a call to docount before every instruction.
}
// this function is called every time whenever any new instruction is encountered.
VOID Fini (INT32 code, VOID *v)
{
    fprintf (stderr, "%llu\n", icount);
}
// When the application exits, this function is called.
// in following. argc, argv are the entire command line
int main (int argc, char * argv [])
{
    PIN_Init (argc, argv);
    // this will Initialize pin
    INS_AddInstrumentFunction (Instruction, 0);
    // this is called to instrument instructions (Register Instruction)
    PIN_AddFiniFunction (Fini, 0);
    // when the application exits, Fini is called
    PIN_StartProgram ();
    // to start the program
    return 0;
}
```

Above code runs on pin framework

```

root@generic_86 : /data/busybox # ./pin -- /system/bin/ls
android -install.tar.gz
busybox
ia32
inscount.out
intel64
obj-ia32
pin
pin.log
pintool.log
root@generic_86 : /data/busybox # cat inscount.out
Count 484677
root@generic_86 : /data/busybox #

```

Figure 10. Output of inscount count pin tool

V. CONCLUSION

We have presented a method of mitigation of security attack in Android Applications using Pin tool which allows the user to instrument an Android Application. Instrumented code alters the behaviour of the original application and the attacker can't find the right way to inject his own code into the running Application. Moreover instrumentation can also be used as a protecting weapon. So here we have used pin tool to mitigation of security attack in android application.

VI. FUTURE WORK

- In future on any malicious android application and mitigate this malicious android application using pin tool,
- Any android application counts the number of instructions and run on pin framework.

VII. REFERENCES

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