

# Indonesia's Foreign Policy Under President Jokowi : More Domestic and Nationalist Orientations

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## ABSTRACT

This paper argues that more domestic and nationalist orientations of Indonesian foreign policy have strongly remarked the Joko 'Jokowi' Widodo's diplomacy in international relations. Presidential change from Susilo Bambang Yudoyono (SBY) to Joko 'Jokowi' Widodo has shifted the way the country practiced its diplomacy towards others. Different from SBY's government, the newly elected president has gradually taken more attention to domestic orientation. While maintaining SBY's achievement on international activism of Indonesian diplomacy, Jokowi's government seeks to find a new space for filling the gap that the previous government seemed to be ignored, that is domestic orientation. President Jokowi has promoted Indonesia as the global maritime axis. In doing so, Indonesia has used its international position for increasing its national economic interests and political sovereignty. By analyzing the importance of nexus between democratic domestic politics and foreign policy, this paper explains two cases on vessel sinks and death penalty. These cases have actually reflected the orientations of Indonesian foreign policy and significantly contributed to the reorientation of Indonesia's foreign policy under the Jokowi government.

**Keywords :** Indonesia's foreign policy, domestic and nationalist orientations, death penalty, sinking boat, Jokowi's government.

## I. INTRODUCTION

Since taking his office in October 2014, Indonesia's President Jokowi has pursued a stridently different style of foreign policy that significantly marks a departure from the multilateralism of his predecessor, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY).<sup>1</sup> In his inauguration address in October 2014, Jokowi stated that Indonesia, as the third-most populous democracy, the most populous Muslim-majority country, and the largest economy in Southeast Asia, would keep pursuing the "free and active" foreign policy, but backed by stronger defensive power. By strengthening the importance of global maritime fulcrum as the new orientation of his foreign policy<sup>2</sup>, President Jokowi also stressed the importance of his so-called Nawa Cita program, which

included calls to build up a credible national security and defense infrastructure. He also mentioned the importance of modernizing the Indonesian Military (TNI)'s outdated equipment and the need to strengthen the national defense industry.<sup>3</sup>

Indonesia today seems to be more assertive in defending its national sovereignty and interests. The free and active foreign policy has been significantly reinterpreted. Under Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono the policy was interpreted as "a thousand friends, zero enemies". In Jokowi's era, the policy has been reinterpreted to become "all nations are friends until Indonesia's sovereignty is degraded and national interests are jeopardized".<sup>4</sup> The reinterpretation is not to say that

<sup>1</sup> Jonathan Pincus, "Widodo's foreign policy drifts towards Sukarnoism", October 12, 2015, <http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/International-Relations/Widodo-s-foreign-policy-drifts-towards-Sukarnoism>, accessed 25 November 2015.

<sup>2</sup> See Retno LP Marsudi, "Diplomasi Poros Maritim Indonesia", harian *Kompas*, 19 September 2014; Rene L. Pattiradjawane, "Maritim Dunia Presiden Jokowi", harian *Kompas*, 23 Oktober 2014.

<sup>3</sup> Asrudin Azwar & Yohanes Sulaiman, "One Year On, Jokowi's Foreign Policy Still Lacks Purpose," <http://jakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/opinion/commentary-one-year-jokowis-foreign-policy-still-lacks-purpose/>, accessed 20 November 2015.

<sup>4</sup> Hikmahanto Juwana, "Insight: Jokowi's foreign policy: Assertive or nationalistic?" June 25 2015, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/06/25/insight-jokowi-s-foreign-policy-assertive-or-nationalistic.html>, accessed 20 November 2015.

president Yudhoyono was wrong, but it was needed to strengthen Indonesia's role at the international level visible.<sup>5</sup> The new interpretation of a free and active foreign policy is shown in two accounts, such as: Sinking foreign ships that commit illegal fishing in Indonesian waters and death penalty for drug-related offenders.

While maintaining SBY's achievement on international activism of Indonesian diplomacy, at the same time, Jokowi's government seeks to find a new space for filling the gap that the previous government seemed to be ignored, that is domestic orientation. With the domestic orientation, President Jokowi has used its international position for increasing its national economic interests and political sovereignty. In general, this paper takes into account the nexus between democratic domestic politics and foreign policy in recent Indonesia, particularly, for promoting domestic orientation in Jokowi's foreign policy. Two cases of study are examples of the changing orientation of recent government's foreign policy. Both are vessel sinks and death penalty in order to reflect a more domestic orientation of Indonesian foreign policy.

## II. METHODS AND MATERIAL

### 1. Shifting Orientation of Indonesia's Foreign Policy

Indonesia has been rising and is on its way to becoming a major regional and global actor. This has become a challenge for President Jokowi's administration. Thus, it is imperative that Indonesia develops a new interpretation of free and active foreign policy.<sup>6</sup> The new interpretation would take into account the diverse political interests of its neighbors and would engage in international relations, which can respond to the fast-changing geopolitical map. However, just like any other country, Indonesia also has its own interests and must take into account the aspirations of its people. An assertive foreign policy may be interpreted by other countries as nationalistic and a self-centered foreign

<sup>5</sup> Ludiro Madu, "Reorientasi Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia pada Pemerintahan Joko Widodo, 2014-2019", *Transnasional: Journal of International Relations*, Universitas Budi Luhur, Jakarta, Vol. 9, No. 2, December 2014, pp.104-17.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

policy. Today's Indonesia is very different from what it used to be. Its emerging economy coupled with the doctrines of sovereignty and national interests has given confidence, leading to a more assertive stance. It knows what it wants and is willing to strive to get it. When it comes to national interest, the administration is unwilling to negotiate and ready to confront whatever or whoever stands in its way. Furthermore, countries must understand that the new shape of foreign policy is not merely what President Jokowi desired, but it is the aspiration of the people. Jokowi's asserted that Indonesia's foreign policy must "bring diplomacy back to earth" (*diplomasi membumi*).<sup>7</sup> In a growing democracy, citizens have more say in shaping Indonesia's relations with other countries compared to the past. Thus, Indonesia's assertive foreign policy has taken into account what the public wants. Most of Jokowi's policies mentioned above, such as sinking foreign ships that commit illegal fishing and executions of drug kingpins, were widely supported by the Indonesian public.<sup>8</sup>

Considering the promise of a Global Maritime Axis and the fact that Indonesia indeed occupies a very important geostrategic space at a time when the world is witnessing a shift to a "Pacific Century" and growing economic and political importance of this region, the foreign policy accomplishments of Jokowi's administration so far have been underwhelming.<sup>9</sup> Indonesia could play a much more important role in the region and beyond, but for that to happen the president and his aides should craft coherent and persuasive long-term strategies. Taking the nation's foreign relations seriously would be good start.<sup>10</sup>

Jokowi's actions contrast with former President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's motto of "a million friends and zero enemies," where Indonesia kept a low profile despite being Southeast Asia's largest economy and the world's fourth-most populous nation. While Jokowi may want Indonesia to be more visible, a proactive foreign policy could also distract him from an ambitious agenda

<sup>7</sup> Aaron L. Connelly, "Sovereignty and the Sea: President Joko Widodo's Foreign Policy Challenges", *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 37, No. 1, 2015, p.6.

<sup>8</sup> Juwana, *op.cit.*

<sup>9</sup> Rizal Sukma, "Gagasan Poros Maritim", *Kompas*, August 21, 2014

<sup>10</sup> Azwar & Sulaiman, *op.cit.*

to revive economic growth at home.<sup>11</sup> President Jokowi started stepping away from his predecessor's foreign policy of keeping everyone happy. Jokowi, criticized the United Nations and International Monetary Fund at the Asian African Conference in Jakarta. He pledged to increase defense spending, ordered foreign boats seized for illegal fishing to be destroyed, and declined to pardon two Australian drug smugglers facing a firing squad, leading to warnings of damaged ties. In addition, Jokowi seems unafraid of making enemies to further domestic priorities, whereas it would be unthinkable for Yudhoyono to criticize the IMF and the UN.<sup>12</sup> Jokowi looked to be more relaxed and confident as the leaders of China and Japan flanked him during the conference in Jakarta, as he woos foreign capital to help fund his 7 percent economic growth target. That compared with his early forays on the regional stage -- including the G-20 summit in Brisbane in November 2014 soon after he took office -- where he appeared ill at ease and said little in public.<sup>13</sup>

Hikmahanto Juwana, a professor of international law and relations at the University of Indonesia thinks the current inward focus of Indonesia's foreign policy under Jokowi is a counteraction to that of the SBY administration. Indonesia's international roles during the SBY and Marty era were appreciated by the public, but the local public ---SBYs own constituents--- wanted something more concrete or 'down to earth' and give real benefit to Indonesian society. During SBY's government, Indonesia's regional and internal roles are not something concrete to them. On the other hand,

<sup>11</sup> "Indonesia's Foreign Policy Turns Domestic Under Jokowi," <http://jakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/news/indonesias-foreign-policy-turns-domestic-jokowi/>, accessed 25 November 2015.

<sup>12</sup> That compares with Jokowi's rhetoric that harks back to Sukarno, the nation's first president and father of the head of Jokowi's political party, who helped initiate the Asian African Conference in West Java in 1955. The meeting presented a united front against colonialism and laid the groundwork for the non-aligned movement, a group of states not formally allied with any major bloc during the Cold War. See Pincus, *op.cit.*; Frederic Camroux David, "Jokowi's Indonesia: Executions, Diplomacy and the Sukarnoist Turn", *Les analyses du CERJ*, 21/05/2015, <http://www.sciencespo.fr/ceji/fr/content/jokowi-s-indonesia-executions-diplomacy-and-sukarnoist-turn>, accessed 20 November 2015.

<sup>13</sup> Yudith Ho and Rieka Rahadiana, "Indonesia Under Widodo Shifts From 'Zero-Enemies' Diplomacy," April 24, 2015, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-23/indonesia-under-widodo-steps-away-from-zero-enemies-diplomacy>, accessed 25 November 2015.

Jokowi wants to give something real to the people, thus the attention to Indonesian migrant workers and Indonesian crew members in South Korea, to show the Indonesian people that the cabinet was really working.<sup>14</sup> By implementing different foreign policy from SBY's, it does not mean that Jokowi must abandon its international roles.<sup>15</sup>

Reorientation of Indonesia's foreign policy also increased the idea of nationalism. This idea has always been in Indonesian politics because it is a notion that would sell well. During presidential campaigns in 2014, both candidates championed the nationalism idea in their own way.<sup>16</sup> For Jokowi's campaign, the nationalism pitch was always going to be there whether he liked it or not because of his Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) party's strong nationalistic sentiments. According to Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi, Jokowi's foreign policy is not reflecting a narrow nationalism, but was more results-driven and people-oriented. In her special remark at the Washington DC., Retno Marsudi rejected criticism of its narrow nationalism and stressing its important contributions regionally and globally. She confirms that "What has changed, however, is that today, Indonesia wants its foreign policy to bring as much possible tangible results that can be felt by everyday Indonesians. Indonesian foreign policy serves the immediate needs of our national interests; the needs of the Indonesian people."<sup>17</sup>

Some criticism revealed that the appointment of Retno Marsudi as Jokowi's Foreign Minister has contributed to Indonesia's inward looking in pursuing its international interests. The fact that the President's inexperience in foreign policy<sup>18</sup> has also given much opportunity to Marsudi for developing Jokowi's vision<sup>19</sup> in giving

<sup>14</sup> "Indonesia's Foreign Policy Turns...", *op.cit.*

<sup>15</sup> Madu, "Reorientasi Politik Luar Negeri...", *op.cit.*

<sup>16</sup> Ludiro Madu, "Uji Politik Luar Negeri Presiden", *Suara Merdeka* daily, July 31, 2014.

<sup>17</sup> Prashanth Parameswaran, "Indonesia Defends its Foreign Policy Record under Jokowi", September 22, 2015, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/indonesia-defends-its-foreign-policy-record-under-jokowi/>, accessed 22 November 2015.

<sup>18</sup> Andrew Wiguna Mantong, "Insiden Natuna, Penyanderaan Nelayan Indonesia, dan Kebijakan Luar Negeri Indonesia", *Analisis, CSIS, Jakarta*, Vol. 45, No. 2, 2016, pp. 136-7.

<sup>19</sup> Natalie Sambhi, "Indonesia's Foreign Policy Challenges and Australia-Indonesia Relations", in Jonathan Chen, (et.al.), *New Perspectives on Indonesia: Understanding Australia's Closest Asian Neighbour*, Perth USAsia Centre, Perth, Western Australia, 2014, p. 25.

priority to domestic interests through various bilateral cooperation than regional or multilateral ones. An Australian-based Indonesianist, Greg Fealy, even blamed this tendency to Jokowi's "unsophisticated view of the world". Nevertheless, this criticism also gave somewhat strong foundation for Jokowi's foreign policy that is different from his predecessor.<sup>20</sup>

Jokowi's pro-people approach further reinforced this nationalism ideal, as many people in Indonesia have for years been accustomed to the doctrine of foreign capitalists acquiring or "robbing" Indonesia of its assets and dominating its vast market. A piece of analysis by Lowly Institute argued that "anti-foreign sentiments" and Jokowi's "populist preferences" have factored in the making of protectionist policies.<sup>21</sup> However, it also argues the policies are prompted by economic by certain economic strains, including the movement in the exchange rate and a drop in Indonesia's trade competitiveness.<sup>22</sup>

The tendency of domestic orientation, instead of nationalism, in Indonesia's foreign policy does not eliminate Indonesia's activism in international diplomacy. Foreign Ministry spokesman Michael Tene refused accusations that the Indonesian government under Joko was abandoning its international roles. Several weeks after taking Presidential office, Jokowi had attended a series of multilateral summits, such as the APEC, G-20, and Asean forums, as well as a series of bilateral meetings on the sidelines of those multilateral events. The bilateral meetings with her German, Australian, and Singaporean counterparts were among others. These diplomatic involvement strongly confirms Indonesia's continued active roles in various regional and international forums. Jokowi introduced himself in those international forums and promoted his economic policies and maritime doctrine as a signal of Indonesia's for Indonesia's openness for foreign investment. In addition to dynamic security architecture in Asia with particular reference to claim conflicts at the South China

<sup>20</sup> Johannes Nugroho, "Now What? Indonesia, China, and the Hague Ruling", *Strategic Review*, Vol. 6, No.4, 2016.

<sup>21</sup> Aaron L. Connelly, "Indonesian Foreign Policy under President Jokowi", *Lowy Institute Analysis*, October 2014.

<sup>22</sup> Ardi Wirdana, "Is Indonesia Nationalism Going to Suffocate Foreign Businesses?" October 27, 2015, <http://www.establishmentpost.com/Indonesia-nationalism-going-suffocate-foreign-businesses/>, accessed 22 November 2015.

Sea, the Foreign Ministry continued to pay attention to talks over a code of conduct for the South China Sea, preparation for the Asean Economic Community, and other planned regional and international agreements that had begun during SBY's era.<sup>23</sup>

After two years in office, President Joko's foreign policy has seemingly managed to recover state sovereignty and national pride. The vast majority of domestic society has a positive perception of the nation's foreign policies. For instance, the execution of transnational drugs smugglers, the destruction of illegal fishing boats, and the policy on high speed train. The people largely are satisfied with what the government has done in terms of a 'free' or 'independent' foreign policy emphasizing short-term national interests.<sup>24</sup>

## 2. Shock Therapy to Illegal Fishing Boats

Just like his predecessors, Jokowi does not downplay the relevance of geography and geopolitics in the making of foreign policy. In a nation that is fast emerging as a middle power, Jokowi has to take into account demography and domestic politics, including managing rising nationalist sentiments in foreign policy making. To be one among equals in the region, President Jokowi needs to formulate a pragmatic foreign policy. As he goes about strengthening his credentials at home, he should not burn the proverbial diplomatic bridges. The seizure of the fishing vessels is Jokowi's way of telling Indonesians that he is no pushover when it comes to defending the sovereignty and national resources of the state.<sup>25</sup>

Since coming to power, Jokowi has vowed to toughen Indonesia's approach as part of his broader vision of turning the country into a "global maritime fulcrum" between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. In Jokowi's

<sup>23</sup> "Indonesia's Foreign Policy Turns Domestic Under Jokowi," <http://jakarta.globe.beritasatu.com/news/indonesias-foreign-policy-turns-domestic-jokowi/>, accessed 27 November 2015.

<sup>24</sup> Mohamad Rosyidin, "Redesigning Indonesia's foreign policy in the 21st century: Niche diplomacy the way forward on the regional and global stage", *Strategic Review*, 10 November 2015, <http://www.sr-indonesia.com/web-exclusives/view/redesigning-indonesia-s-foreign-policy-in-the-21st-century>, accessed 30 November 2015.

<sup>25</sup> B.A. Hamzah, "Sinking the Ships: Indonesia's Foreign Policy under Jokowi", *RSIS Commentary*, No. 016 – 20 January 2015.

view, Jakarta can no longer tolerate a situation where over 5,000 ships operate illegally in its waters every day, making a mockery out of Indonesian sovereignty and resulting in annual losses of over \$20 billion. Through his Fisheries Minister Susi Pudjiastuti's, Jokowi launched a "shock therapy" policy on sinking boats which allegedly took illegal fishing in Indonesia's marine territory. She ordered the Navy to blow up foreign boats suspected of conducting illegal fishing activities in Indonesian waters.<sup>26</sup> Domestically, this is wildly popular and seen as a sign that Indonesia finally got its act together in reclaiming maritime sovereignty.

The sinking was also accompanied by the usual nationalist rhetoric by Indonesian officials. Susi herself noted that since Indonesia – the world's largest archipelagic nation – has two thirds of its territory comprised of water, it must have sovereignty over its territorial waters to ensure its unity. The Indonesia's Minister for Maritime and Fisheries Susi Pudjiastuti had actually said publicly that the country may blow up 70 foreign ships – a number which coincides with the 70th year of Indonesian independence. The number have made it the largest mass public sinking since President Jokowi first introduced his tough crackdown on illegal fishing in Indonesian waters since coming to power. The last one of its kind, which occurred on May 20, 2015 to commemorate National Awakening Day, involved 41 foreign vessels, including the first vessel from China to be sunk.<sup>27</sup>

At the same time, the move has shocked Indonesia's neighbors, notably fellow members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, who were used to the relaxed attitude of Indonesian officials in previous administrations. Some are now warning that this policy threatens the development of a closer-knit ASEAN community. Even China expressed its concerns over this issue, though not very strongly, most likely because it is valuing its current relationship with Indonesia too much. What is clear, however, is that everybody is paying attention -- in that sense the "shock therapy" has worked.

<sup>26</sup> Ludiro Madu, "Daulat Maritim", *Kedaulatan Rakyat* daily, December 3, 2014.

<sup>27</sup> Prashanth Parameswaran, "Indonesia Sinks 34 Foreign Ships in War on Illegal Fishing: A closer look at Jakarta's latest mass public sinking", <http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/indonesia-sinks-34-foreign-vessels-in-its-war-on-illegal-fishing/>, accessed 30 November 2015.

Yet the government seems unable to use this opportunity to craft a long-term solution. It would be very beneficial for Indonesia to team up with other nations, especially fellow ASEAN members and even China, India and Japan, to push for a comprehensive agreement to fight illegal fishing and to promote sustainable fishery practices, while cementing Indonesia's status as the natural leader of the Southeast Asia region.<sup>28</sup>

President Jokowi's policy of transforming the Indonesian maritime space is three-pronged. The first prong deals with strengthening internal resilience. The crackdown on illegal fishing is just one aspect of it. Upgrading the capabilities of the navy and air force is the second. The third prong involves the construction of some 24 deep-seaports across the entire archipelago as well as improving other support facilities in the maritime sector.<sup>29</sup> Jakarta gave signal not only its willingness to apply its 'sink the vessels' policy consistently, but perhaps its desire to take a harder line on illegal fishing more generally as well — albeit within limits. It was notable, for instance, that Indonesia's Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Minister Susi Pudjiastuti told *The Jakarta Post* following the sinking that the government had been too lenient in dealing with illegal fishing.<sup>30</sup> Strengthening the implementation of this policy in Indonesia's maritime territory has hallmarked the increasing tense of domestic-oriented foreign policy in Jokowi's era.

### 3. Death Penalty to Drug Smugglers

President Jokowi has also reintroduced the death penalty for drug smugglers after a hiatus under SBY's government. Brazil and the Netherlands recalled their ambassadors after Indonesia executed their citizens in January 2015. Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff

<sup>28</sup> Many observers look at this policy tends to put Indonesia away from its neighbouring countries in Southeast Asia, see Prashanth Parameswaran, "Jakarta's policy of sinking illegal vessels looks set to continue despite lingering concerns", January 13, 2015, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/explaining-indonesias-sink-the-vessels-policy-under-jokowi/>, accessed 30 November 2015.

<sup>29</sup> B.A. Hamzah, *op.cit.*

<sup>30</sup> Prashanth Parameswaran, "Why Did Indonesia Just Sink a Vessel From China? A brief look behind a significant development," May 22, 2015, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/why-did-indonesia-just-sink-a-vessel-from-china/>, accessed 30 November 2015.

declined to accept the credentials of the nation's new envoy, leading Indonesia to recall its ambassador. Indonesia has ordered preparations for the executions of two Australian drug smugglers -- Andrew Chan and Myuran Sukumaran, part of a group known as the Bali Nine. Recent development, however, shows that the death penalty did not disturb bilateral relations between Indonesia and those countries.<sup>31</sup>

The executions of foreign nationals convicted of drug-related offenses, despite repeated appeals by the countries whose nationals were on death row, Indonesia proceeded with the executions. President Jokowi continuously emphasized that imposing a death penalty on drug-related convicts was Indonesia's sovereign right, which had to be respected by all other countries. His message was clear: The executions had to be carried out, even at the risk of losing friends or turning them into enemies. This message also applied to a longtime ally and Indonesia's traditionally great friend, Australia, whose citizens were among those executed.<sup>32</sup>

This policy directly signalled the nationalist rhetoric in the new president's early forays into foreign policy. In April 2015, President Jokowi justified the execution of seven foreigners convicted of drug smuggling as a defense of national sovereignty. "No one may intervene with the executions because it is our sovereign right to exercise our laws," he announced in reply to last-minute appeals from foreign governments and the United Nations. Another example of the government being caught off guard by international reactions was the execution of drug convicts. Fourteen people have been killed this year, including 12 foreign nationals.<sup>33</sup> Drug

<sup>31</sup> Ludiro Madu, "Hukuman Mati Mengganggu Hubungan Bilateral", *Kolom Detiknews.com*, January 19, 2015, <http://detik.com/news/kolom/2807478/hukuman-mati-mengganggu-hubungan-bilateral/2>, accessed 30 November 2015.

<sup>32</sup> Juwana, *op.cit.*

<sup>33</sup> Currently, 360 Indonesians face the death penalty abroad. Based on 2012 data from Migrant Care, 31 citizens were condemned to death and awaiting execution in Malaysia, China and Saudi Arabia. This, too, may present a diabolical dilemma for Jokowi. Aside from the Indonesian nationals on death row, over a third of the remainder are from countries where Indonesian citizens currently face execution for a range of offences. Jokowi's vow to refuse clemency to all 64 drug offenders will limit any prospects of reciprocity and almost undoubtedly hamper efforts to save Indonesian citizens, see Sarah Gill, "Capital punishment: Jokowi's twin policy

smuggling and its distribution -- especially to minors -- are very serious offenses and Joko's administration has the duty to clamp down on drug abuse in Indonesia. These convicts were warned that they were gambling with their lives by bringing drugs to Indonesia.

At the same time, however, by simply executing the drug convicts, Jokowi gave up bargaining chips he could have used to pressure those nations whose citizens were on death row -- for instance to help Indonesia to rescue its own nationals facing the death penalty in the Middle East. The president, instead of skillfully using this issue for the nation's benefit, kept framing the whole affair as the only way for Indonesia to deal with its drug problems. Moreover, by executing these people instead of letting them spend their lives in prison without any chance of parole, Indonesia gained nothing but the wrath of other nations. Australia, Brazil and the Netherlands withdrew their ambassadors, and France was threatening to do the same, with additional threats to review its agreement to invest in Indonesia and to put up additional roadblocks to Indonesian exports, had its citizen, Serge Atlaoui, been executed.<sup>34</sup> The whole affair was a major distraction, with precious time wasted that could have been used to make trade deals or help Indonesians in trouble abroad.

The more the international community fought the president's decision on executions, the more Jokowi gained from it. Moreover, On March 2, Kompas -- one of Indonesia's biggest daily newspapers -- published an opinion poll about how people saw Jokowi's foreign policy. One of the questions asked was about Andrew Chan and Myuran Sukumaran's executions. Some 86% of respondents agreed that Chan and Sukumaran should be executed regardless of the Australian government's protests. To these people, Jokowi's move represents strength -- a character that leaders must possess. In the same opinion poll, 57.8% respondents were willing to cut off diplomatic relations with any country that failed to show respect for Indonesia's law, including Australia. This noticeably high percentage shows that, for most Indonesians, national pride is something important to

positions", the Jakarta Post, March 05, 2015, <http://m.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/03/05/capital-punishment-jokowi-s-twin-policy-positions.html>, accessed 30 November 2015.

<sup>34</sup> Madu, "Hukuman Mati...", *op.cit.*

hold on to.<sup>35</sup> The 86.3% of death penalty supporters maintain that this punishment has to be conducted despite the threat from other countries to limit diplomatic and trade relations. This indicates that the ensuing media reports has made many in Indonesia to consider the issue of death penalty mainly as part of the country's struggle to fight off "foreign pressure".<sup>36</sup>

Yet Jokowi's actions cannot be understood without reference to the wider context of Indonesia's foreign relations. Jokowi's foreign policy represents a return to the guided democracy period of Indonesia's founding president, Sukarno. Certainly the 'boy from the kampongs' has a very different persona from the aristocratic Sukarno, yet both their direct charismatic appeal to the masses and their political philosophies have common features. Both view the international stage as being, above all, a means of advancing their domestic agenda. Former president SBY issued a moratorium on the use of the death penalty. This showed he understood that demonstrating the emerging power of the 'world's largest Muslim country and third largest democracy' required being sensitive to Western norms. Jokowi, like Sukarno, would appear to have no such qualms.<sup>37</sup>

When Jokowi came to power, he promised to be decisive and to stand up for Indonesia. Yet even before the latest executions, Jokowi had signalled a break with the past. The execution and other policies strongly indicates that Jokowi abandoned the "thousand friends" policy after returning from his first foreign trip as president. Jokowi favours those countries "who give the most benefit to the people. What's the point of having many friends if we only get the disadvantages?"<sup>38</sup> As countries around the world need to adjust to Indonesia's foreign policy, powerful and developed states may no longer exert pressure on issues inherently within the domestic jurisdiction of Indonesia. Furthermore, other countries

<sup>35</sup> Kompas, March 2, 2015.

<sup>36</sup> Deasy Simandjuntak, "Spectacle Of The Scaffold? The Politics Of Death Penalty In Indonesia", *Institute of Southeast Asian Studies*, September 17, 2015, <http://www.eurasia-review.com/17092015-spectacle-of-the-scaffold-the-politics-of-death-penalty-in-indonesia-analysis/>, accessed 2 December 2015.

<sup>37</sup> Camroux, *op.cit.*

<sup>38</sup> "Indonesia's foreign policy: A thousand jilted friends", May 2nd 2015, <http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21650173-new-president-charts-markedly-different-course-thousand-jilted-friends>, accessed 2 December 2015.

must understand that the new shape of foreign policy is not merely what President Jokowi desires, but it is the aspiration of the people. To many in the Indonesian public, countries exerting pressure on Indonesia were defending criminals. The public then reacted in giving more support to the government to resist. In a growing democracy, citizens have more say in shaping Indonesia's relations with other countries compared to the past.<sup>39</sup>

### III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

#### Consequences and Challenges Ahead

Those two cases reaffirms Widodo's approach of foreign policy has been more pragmatic than Yudhoyono. Jokowi made his nascent pronouncements about Indonesia's future foreign policy in his presidential debates, speeches, and 'vision and mission' (*visi misi*) statements during the election campaign. The 'vision and mission' statement articulates four foreign policy priorities: preserving Indonesia's maritime domain; increasing middle power diplomacy; consolidating both economic and security relationships in the Indo-Pacific (particularly with other ASEAN states); and formulating foreign policy that both involves and reflects the interests of the community as well as reforming the foreign ministry.<sup>40</sup>

In initiating her new policy, Pudjiastuti invited Ambassadors of neighbouring countries, such as Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Vietnam, and China. This new policy, of course, attracted mixed responses from those governments from which those Ambassadors represented. With the principle of managing and protecting Indonesia's authority its maritime area, the policy also interestingly resulted in criticism in domestic levels. In several cases, foreign owners of illegal shipping cooperated with their Indonesian partners for appropriating national regulations for obtaining shipping and fishing permits.

<sup>39</sup> Juwana, *op.cit.*

<sup>40</sup> "Jalan perubahan untuk Indonesia yang berdaulat, mandiri dan berkepribadian: visi misi, dan program aksi", Vision Mission statement of the Jokowi Jusuf Kalla 2014 campaign, May 2014, [http://kpu.go.id/koleksigambar/VISI\\_MISI\\_Jokowi-JK.pdf](http://kpu.go.id/koleksigambar/VISI_MISI_Jokowi-JK.pdf), pp. 12-14.

However, the new policy significantly asserted Indonesia's serious attempt in managing its maritime resources and protecting its maritime border. Minister Pudjiastuti also pointed out Indonesia's loss of illegal fisheries by foreign ships which broke the law of fishing and the accepted size of foreign ships in Indonesia's maritime areas.

In taking risks of Indonesia's bilateral relations to its neighbouring countries, Pudjiastuti closely held hand-in-hand with Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi. Entering the third year of Jokowi's government, Pudjiastuti managed to secure a certain amount of maritime resources for Indonesia's fisheries traditional industries. Less illegal shipping and fishing has circled around Indonesia's maritime territory. Minister Pudjiastuti also claimed that several countries, such as the Philippines, has suffered the implementation of Indonesia's strict policy on maritime fisheries. The Philippines' maritime industries had much depended on its fish supply from Indonesia's area for a long time. Indonesia's maritime territory has also lacked of illegal foreign ships which gave Indonesia's traditional fisheries more opportunity to catch various fishes from their own area without competing with other foreign ships.

Similar to the first case study, the death penalty also spurred criticism from foreign countries from whom the drugs dealer come from. Australia withdrew its Ambassador which consequently put bilateral relations on the lowest level since Jokowi took Presidential office. Brazilian government also did the same protest as Australia against Indonesia's policy. While other countries, such as France, seemed to be cautious by sending similar protest to Indonesia's government and asking for further review for punishing its citizen.

#### IV. CONCLUSION

Those two accounts strongly explained the shift of Indonesia's foreign policy from global to domestic and nationalist orientation. The fact that this nature is different from that of President SBY shows the increasing attention of Indonesian people in supporting or opposing foreign policy that Jokowi has practised. More importantly, the shift of foreign policy from promoting Indonesia in international stage in the era of SBY to weighing more domestic orientation in Jokowi's

era also strengthens tendency on growing role and influence of President as one of veto players in democratic Indonesia. Although democracy promotes other players to determined foreign policy making, the two cases shows the dominant role of President in foreign policy decision making in Indonesia.

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